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tion (3) we must also drop the assumption of identity between ex-
plicitness and consciousness. As several commentators suggested
(Church, Cleeremans & Jimenez, Dennett & Westbury,  Kurthen,
McDermott, Van Gulick, and Wolters & Phaf; cf. BBS 22[1], 1999),
explicitness could be necessary but not sufficient for conscious-
ness. O&O’s only support for the identification of explicitness and
consciousness comes from their reappraisal of the dissociation
studies. However, this is possibly the most questionable point in
their paper. Lacking a final verdict on the issue, it seems that their
persistence in identifying both properties is due to their thinking
that “it is clearly incompatible with the connectionist vehicle the-
ory of phenomenal experience [to assume] the operation of explic-
itly represented information that does not figure in consciousness”
(p. 187). I claim that there is no such incompatibility, insofar as we
drop structural explicitness. This leads us to position (4).
First, all that a vehicle theory of consciousness demands, ac-
cording to Thomas & Atkinson and Van Gulick (cf. BBS 22[1],
1999), is a principled distinction between kinds of representa-
tions, R and R1, so that the intrinsic properties of a given kind
make it the basis of conscious experience. Second, from a process
explicitness viewpoint, the more accessible some information I is,
the more explicit I will be. Third, from a vehicle consciousness
perspective we can say that I becomes conscious only when it is
explicit and encoded by a specific kind of representation, (say, R1).
This would fill position (4).
A connectionist version of this possibility is: (1a) Two kinds of
patterns, P and P1. (2a) Gradation of explicitness: information in
weights is less accessible than information in patterns. (3a) Infor-
mation in patterns is not immediately conscious; only some pat-
terns are so, say P1. But now we open the door to classical vehicle
theories of consciousness: (1b) Two kinds of symbols, S and S1.
(2b) Gradation of explicitness: some symbolic information is more
explicit by being more accessible. (3b) Only an explicit S1 makes
its contents conscious.
Both versions, however, face the same problem: how to single
out an intrinsic property that provides a principled distinction be-
tween the patterns P and P1 or the symbols S and S1. There is an
obvious place to look for such a principled structural distinction
between representational kinds: the distinction itself between pat-
terns and symbols. Suppose that we allow both kinds of represen-
tations in our system. We can fill position (4) as follows: (1c) Two
kinds of representations: symbols and patterns. (2c) Gradation of
explicitness: from content in weights to content in patterns, and
content in accessible symbols. (3c) Content is conscious only when
it is rendered into explicit symbolic format. This can require the
extraction of the content from the network.
Two notes: First, a “purely vehicle” theory of consciousness
need not be “purely connectionist” or “purely symbolic”; it can
contain instances of both representational kinds. Second, even if
the content has to be extracted for being conscious, this does not
make it a process theory. It is not being extracted that makes the
content conscious; it is being symbolic that makes it so. If O&O
insist that extraction makes this version a process theory of con-
sciousness, then they should equally answer the charge (Mac
Aogáin, Wolters & Phaf; cf. BBS 22[1], 1999) that a pattern is al-
ways the product of some process.
Things are probably much more mixed up than suggested by
any simple theory of consciousness. If connectionist and symbolic
vehicles belong to different “representational genera” according
to the contents they are capable of representing (Haugeland
1991), then they may underlie different kinds of conscious states.
On the other hand, it is also dubious that a purely vehicle or a
purely process theory will account for consciousness. I have ar-
gued elsewhere (Martinez & Ezquerro 1998) that intuitions from
the structural and the process views should be integrated to offer
an appropriate characterization of explicitness, and an analogous
claim can be made with respect to vehicle and process theories of
consciousness. In other words, the character of conscious experi-
ences may depend not on what a representation is or on what it
does but rather in the subtle interaction of both factors.
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Abstract: Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a pos-
sible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue
that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid ve-
hicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify
the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of con-
sciousness.
In developing the connectionist vehicle theory of phenom-
enal experience we were mindful of two things: (1) that con-
sciousness is, by and large, a consequence of the brain’s rep-
resenting activity, (2) that current theories of mental
representation are heavily influenced by the classical com-
putational theory of mind. Connectionism presents a
unique opportunity to rethink consciousness because, un-
like classicism, its account of cognition is framed in terms
of certain structural properties of the brain. In particular,
connectionism distinguishes between two structurally dis-
tinct kinds of representing vehicle: connection weight rep-
resentations, and activation pattern representations. Others
have noticed the possibility of identifying phenomenal ex-
perience with the relatively transient activation patterns
that constantly course across the brain, while assigning con-
nection weights the twin tasks of information storage and
computational substrate (Rumelhart et al. 1986, p. 39;
Smolensky 1988, p. 13; Lloyd 1991; 1995; 1996). In our tar-
get article we sought to further develop and defend this
idea, conjecturing that phenomenal consciousness is iden-
tical to the vehicles of explicit representation in the brain –
such vehicles being understood as stable patterns of neural
activation.
Martínez-Manrique, in his useful commentary, argues
that we have overlooked a possible variety of vehicle theory,
one moreover that contains both connectionist and classi-
cal elements. His crucial move, in canvassing this possibil-
ity, is to exploit the distinction between structural and
process conceptions of explicit representation. In our tar-
get article we develop a generic representational frame-
work that characterizes explicit representation in structural
terms. Martínez-Manrique observes that there is well-
known analysis, primarily due to Kirsh (1990), according to
which information is explicit if it is readily accessible by a
cognitive system, and is, by degrees, less explicit if it is more
difficult to access. As Martínez-Manrique admits, this is a
process conception of explicit representation. But one may
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recover a vehicle theory of consciousness, he thinks, if ex-
plicitness is treated as necessary but not sufficient for con-
sciousness. An additional (vehicle) criterion might be added,
to the effect that a widely available representational content
will be conscious when its vehicle satisfies some intrinsic,
structural constraint. This, claims Martínez-Manrique, ulti-
mately permits a vehicle theory in which connectionist (ac-
tivation pattern) and classical (symbolic) representations both
play a part.
At the outset we must say that Martínez-Manrique’s
analysis of the space of possible theories seems to us seri-
ously flawed. Contrary to what he claims, one cannot co-
herently combine a vehicle theory of consciousness with a
process conception of explicit representation. A vehicle
theory of consciousness seeks to explain phenomenal expe-
rience in terms of the intrinsic nature of the brain’s explicit
representing vehicles – in terms of what these vehicles are
rather than what they do. A process conception of explicit-
ness holds that information is explicitly represented in a
cognitive system when it can be easily accessed. But the
ease with which a representational content can be accessed
is not solely or even largely determined by the intrinsic
properties of the vehicle that carries it; it is determined by
the nature of the cognitive system in which that vehicle is
embedded. Consequently, there just is no coherent formu-
lation of a vehicle theory of consciousness which adopts a
process conception of explicitness: one cannot hope to ex-
plain phenomenal consciousness in terms of intrinsic prop-
erties of the brain’s explicit representing vehicles when ex-
plicitness is determined largely by properties extrinsic to
these vehicles. We thus hold to our conclusion, drawn in our
target article, that only connectionism has the resources to
develop a plausible vehicle theory of consciousness.
Given this, perhaps a better interpretation of Martínez-
Manrique’s commentary is not that there is a nonconnec-
tionist vehicle theory we have overlooked but that there is
a way of combining structural and process criteria within a
single account – a maneuver which, in effect, generates a
hybrid vehicle/process theory. Martínez-Manrique’s ulti-
mate suggestion is that a content is conscious “only when it
is rendered into explicit symbolic format” (para.8). Being
symbolic is the vehicle criterion. What is the process crite-
rion? In typical process accounts a representational content
is taken to be conscious when its vehicle is subject to rela-
tions of widespread informational access – that is, when it
has rich and widespread information processing effects on
the brain’s ongoing operations. However, as we explained
previously (O’Brien & Opie 1999, pp. 176–77), any hybrid
account that followed this line would violate one of the
deepest intuitions we have about consciousness: that con-
scious experience makes a difference. If a symbolic content
must give rise to widespread information processing effects
in order to enter consciousness, its being conscious cannot
be the cause of those effects. But this is not Martínez-Man-
rique’s strategy. Rather than focusing on informational 
access, his process criterion is informational accessibility:
representational contents are conscious when they are en-
coded symbolically and can readily be accessed and put to
use in the service of cognition. And it might be argued that
this change of focus renders his hybrid vehicle/process the-
ory consistent with the causal potency of consciousness.
One obvious problem with any theory that makes infor-
mational accessibility, rather than informational access, cri-
terial for consciousness is that it runs the risk of being em-
pirically implausible. Nothing could be clearer than the fact
that we have at our fingertips a vast store of unconscious but
readily accessible information. Martínez-Manrique’s pro-
posal can skirt over this difficulty, however, because it holds
that accessibility is insufficient for consciousness; con-
sciousness also requires the satisfaction of a structural (ve-
hicle) criterion. Our worry with this hybrid vehicle/process
theory is different, but just as straightforward. We think it
unmotivated and unparsimonious. It is unmotivated be-
cause, although it is clear why one might seek to explain
consciousness by identifying it with either the intrinsic
properties of the brain’s representing vehicles (in doing so
one connects consciousness with the very entities that drive
human cognition) or the information processing effects of
these representing vehicles (in doing so one connects con-
sciousness with the process of accessing the information
these vehicles carry), it is unclear why one would seek to ex-
plain consciousness in terms of the fact that certain repre-
sentational contents are more readily accessible than oth-
ers. And it is unparsimonious because it accounts for
consciousness in terms of both intrinsic and extrinsic prop-
erties of the brain’s representing vehicles when simpler the-
ories that restrict themselves to one or other class of prop-
erties have yet to be fully explored.
In this vein, it is useful to consider why Martínez-Man-
rique so quickly dismisses our connectionist vehicle theory.
He does so because he thinks connectionism is incapable of
distinguishing conscious representing vehicles from their
unconscious counterparts by recourse to a structural crite-
rion of explicitness. And Martínez-Manrique reaches this
conclusion by interpreting the stability of an activation pat-
tern representation as a temporal, rather than a structural,
property of a neural network. We think Martínez-Manrique
is wrong about this. As we were at pains to point out in 
our original “Authors’ Response” (O’Brien & Opie 1999r,
pp. 181), there is a widespread misunderstanding of the sig-
nificance of stability in connectionist networks that issues
from a failure to distinguish between the behavior of real
neural networks and the properties of their digital simula-
tions. Since this error persists, we will conclude our discus-
sion by briefly revisiting this issue.
In a simulation, a neural network’s activity is modeled as
an array of numerical activation values, which are periodi-
cally updated by algorithms that model the network’s inter-
nal processes. Simulated relaxation search thus proceeds
via a sequence of determinate numerical arrays, giving the
impression that prior to stabilization a neural network
jumps between specific points in its activation space, and
hence generates a sequence of short-lived activation pat-
terns before settling into a longer lasting pattern. This is the
picture Martínez-Manrique has in mind when he claims
that there is no intrinsic structural distinction among the
“transient” patterns that precede the production of a “sta-
ble” pattern, and hence no structural criterion which can
ground a distinction between unconscious and conscious
states (para. 3). But this picture is misleading. Whenever
one employs a numerical value to describe a continuously
variable physical property, one is imposing an instantaneous
value on this property. Since neural spikes are discrete
events, neural spiking rates do not have instantaneous val-
ues; the notion of a rate, in this case, only makes sense rel-
ative to some time window. In a real network, stabilization
is a process in which constituent neurons adjust the ab-
solute timing of their spikes until a determinate firing rate
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is achieved. Prior to stabilization, neural networks do not
jump around between points in activation space. Stabiliza-
tion is the process whereby a network first generates a de-
terminate activation pattern, and thereby arrives at a point
in activation space.
So a real neural network does not generate a pattern of
activation, and thus a determinate representational con-
tent, until it achieves some measure of stability. Conse-
quently, there is no distinction between “stable” and “tran-
sient” activation patterns. Stable activation patterns are
physical objects, objects moreover that are structurally dis-
tinct from a neural network’s configuration of connection
weights. And it is this distinction, between activation pat-
tern representation and connection weight representation,
that according to our vehicle theory marks the boundary be-
tween the conscious and the unconscious.
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Commentary on Anne Campbell (1999). Staying alive: Evolution, culture, and women’s intrasexual aggression.
BBS 22(2):203–252.
Abstract of the original article: Females’ tendency to place a high value on protecting their own lives enhanced their reproductive
success in the environment of evolutionary adaptation because infant survival depended more upon maternal than on paternal care
and defence. The evolved mechanism by which the costs of aggression (and other forms of risk taking) are weighted more heavily for
females may be a lower threshold for fear in situations which pose a direct threat of bodily injury. Females’ concern with personal sur-
vival also has implications for sex differences in dominance hierarchies because the risks associated with hierarchy formation in non-
bonded exogamous females are not off-set by increased reproductive success. Hence among females, disputes do not carry implica-
tions for status with them as they do among males, but are chiefly connected with the acquisition and defence of scarce resources.
Consequently, female competition is more likely to take the form of indirect aggression or low-level direct combat than among males.
Under patriarchy, men have held the power to propagate images and attributions which are favourable to the continuance of their con-
trol. Women’s aggression has been viewed as a gender-incongruent aberration or dismissed as evidence of irrationality. These cultural
interpretations have “enhanced” evolutionarily based sex differences by a process of imposition which stigmatises the expression of
aggression by females and causes women to offer exculpatory (rather than justificatory) accounts of their own aggression.
Hierarchy disruption: Women and men
János M. Réthelyi and Mária S. Kopp
Institute of Behavioral Sciences, Semmelweis University, Budapest, 1089,
Hungary. retjan@net.sote.hu kopmar@net.sote.hu
www.behsci.sote.hu
Abstract: The application of evolutionary perspectives to analyzing sex
differences in aggressive behavior and dominance hierarchies has been
found useful in multiple areas. We draw attention to the parallel of gen-
der differences in the worsening health status of restructuring societies.
Drastic socio-economic changes are interpreted as examples of hierarchy
disruption, having differential psychological and behavioral impact on
women and men, and leading to different changes in health status.
Campbell’s (1999) target article about gender differences in ag-
gression and status-seeking behavior describes a convincing body
of evidence and presents a plausible evolutionary explanation. The
target article and the commentaries raise a number of questions
concerning the consequences and practical implementations of an
evolutionary theory. We propose that several new findings in the
areas of epidemiology and health psychology yield parallel results
that fit well with Campbell’s model. The phenomenon of health
status deterioration in restructuring societies, primarily those of
Central and Eastern Europe, and the until-now not convincingly
explained gender differences in health deterioration are results
that could serve as a bridge between a behaviorally oriented evo-
lutionary model and large-scale epidemiological findings. Reading
the article and the following debate was a profound intellectual ex-
perience; the recognition of parallel results between different
fields was even more exciting.
Socio-economic changes following political transition in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have influenced people’s
lives in a variety of ways. Among these phenomena, one of the
most striking is the declining health status of these societies
(Feachem 1994). The dynamics of the process show different
characteristics in different countries according to the chronologi-
cal nature of the political changes. In Hungary, deterioration be-
gan in the early 1970s at a constant slow grade, and male life ex-
pectancy decreased by three years between 1970 and 1995,
parallel with political softening and the beginning of economic po-
larization (Bobak & Marmot 1996; Kopp 2000). As a more severe
